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Abstract
This paper investigates the e®ect of foreign aid on corruption using a quantile regres-
sion method. Our estimation results illustrate that foreign aid generally lessens corruption
and, in particular, its reduction e®ect is larger in countries with low levels of corruption.
In addition, considering foreign aid by donors, our analysis indicates that while multi-
lateral aid has a larger reduction impact on corruption, bilateral aid from the world's
leading donors, such as France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, has no sig-
ni¯cant e®ect on corruption. However, bilateral aid from Japan is shown to be statistically
signi¯cant in lessening corruption.
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JEL Classi¯cation: D73; F35
1 Introduction
Poverty reduction in developing countries has always been a great concern for international
communities. Consequently, it is often a main theme addressed in many international arenas.
Although ¯ghting poverty requires various dimensions of policy prescriptions, foreign aid
in both multilateral and bilateral forms from international institutions and donor countries
is considered to be an important element contributing to poverty alleviation in developing
countries.
¤Samreth wishes to acknowledge the ¯nancial support from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science
(JSPS).
yCorresponding author. Graduate School of Economics, Kyoto University, Yoshida-honmachi, Sakyo-ku,
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In spite of its importance, foreign aid may also have impact on the quality of governance,
particularly corruption, in the recipient countries.1 This impact has been examined in many
studies, yielding mixed results. This is due to the fact that, in providing ¯nancial assistance,
while donors often require that the recipient countries make commitments in reducing cor-
ruption, foreign aid also provides public o±cials with more room for rent-seeking behavior,
consequently, leading to an aggravation in corruption in the recipient countries.
Svensson (2000) introduces a simple game-theoretic rent-seeking model and provides pre-
liminary empirical evidence supporting the positive e®ect of foreign aid on corruption. Sim-
ilarly, Knack (2001) provides evidence that higher level of aid may lead to an increase in
corruption, by applying cross-country data. Alesina and Weder (2002) also suggest that for-
eign aid can have positive impacts on corruption. On the other hand, by pointing out that
the evidence of Alesina and Weder (2002) is weak, Tavares (2003) empirically indicates that
foreign aid reduces corruption.
Although they illustrate abundant evidence on the e®ect of foreign aid on corruption, the
previous studies discussed above are primarily based on ordinary least squares (OLS) esti-
mation, instrumental variables estimation, and panel analysis estimation. These approaches
have disadvantages, as they only estimate the parameters of interest at the mean evaluation
by a conditional distribution of the dependent variable (Billger and Goel, 2009).2 Unlike the
previous studies, this paper contributes to the literature by investigating the e®ect of foreign
aid on corruption in recipient countries using the quantile regression (QR) methodology de-
veloped by Koenker and Bassett (1978). The adoption of this method enables us to examine
the e®ect of foreign aid on corruption at di®erent intervals throughout the distribution of the
dependent variable (corruption), providing us with better and more detailed information.
2 Estimation methodology and data
In order to examine the e®ect of foreign aid on corruption, we use the QR approach developed
by Koenker and Bassett (1978) as the estimation methodology. We also report the OLS
results for comparison purposes. The quantile estimator is obtained by solving the following
optimization problem:
min
¯2Rk
264 X
i2fi:yi¸x0i¯g
µ
¯¯
yi ¡ x0i¯
¯¯
+
X
i2fi:yi<x0i¯g
(1¡ µ) ¯¯yi ¡ x0i¯ ¯¯
375 , (1)
for the µth quantile (0 < µ < 1), where yi is the dependent variable and xi is k by 1 vector
of the explanatory variables. Using the QR, we can qualify and quantify the impact of the
1The examination of the e®ect of foreign aid on other social and political elements besides corruption can
be found in the previous studies, such as Djankov et al. (2008) for the e®ect on democracy, and Gomanee,
Girma et al. (2005) and Gomanee, Morrissey et al. (2005) for the e®ect on the human development index
(HDI) and infant mortality.
2Based on the quantile regression method, Billger and Goel (2009) examine the determinants of corruption.
However, their study does not consider foreign aid.
2
di®erent explanatory variables at the di®erent quantiles in the distribution of a dependent
variable. The QR estimation is more robust than the OLS estimation with a presence of
outliers and when the distribution of the dependent variable is a highly nonnormal pattern.
The data for the dependent variable, corruption, is released by the Worldwide Governance
Indicators (WGI). The explanatory variable of most concern is foreign aid, de¯ned as net
disbursements of O±cial Development Assistance (ODA) divided by GDP.3 Following previous
studies such as Serra (2006), other than foreign aid, we take into account economic, political,
and cultural factors as the determinants of corruption.
For the economic factor, GDP per capita is considered, since it is shown to have a sig-
ni¯cant impact on corruption in most previous studies. The corruption level is expected to
decrease with GDP per capita. For the political factor, democracy is taken into account,
following Adserµa et al. (2003), who suggest that corruption is reduced with higher levels of
democracy. Finally, following La Porta et al. (1999) and Treisman (2000), for the cultural
factor, British legal origin is incorporated into our estimation model. Countries that have
adopted British legal origin tend to be less corrupt. A more detailed explanation of the
data and descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1. The annual data from 120 developing
countries over the period from 1995 to 2009 is employed for the estimation. We use ¯ve-year
averages (1995 to 1999, 2000 to 2004, and 2005 to 2009) for each variable to mitigate the
short-term economic °uctuations.
[Table 1 here]
3 Empirical results
Table 2 presents the estimation results using a share of aggregate net disbursements of ODA
to GDP as an aid variable. Robust standard errors for OLS estimates and QR results from the
10,000 bootstrapping repetitions are reported to obtain heteroskedasticity-robust estimates.
The QR results in columns (2) to (6) illustrate that foreign aid generally has a reduction
impact on corruption. In particular, its e®ect is larger in countries with lower levels of cor-
ruption. One possible explanation is that, during the time period from 1995 to 2009 in our
sample, not only the donor institutions, such as the World Bank and the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF), but also major donor countries have paid more attention to government
quality after the end of the Cold War. For explanatory variables other than foreign aid, the
results show that they have the expected signs, which are consistent with those in previous
studies. Economic development and democracy are important determinants reducing corrup-
tion. A di®erence between them is that while economic development diminishes corruption in
all quantile levels and its impacts dwindle with the corruption level, democracy signi¯cantly
reduces corruption in countries with a high level of corruption and its reduction impact in-
creases with the corruption level. In addition, cultural factors from the United Kingdom
3Since net disbursements of ODA are used, we delete the observations with negative values. However, even
if we include these observations, we still obtain similar results.
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(British legal origin) have a reduction in°uence on corruption.
[Table 2 here]
Table 3 shows the estimation results when we replace aggregate aid with multilateral and
bilateral aid from four major donor countries: France, Japan, the United Kingdom (UK),
and the United States (US). The speci¯cation is the same as in Table 2. We only report the
results of aid variables to save space. For explanatory variables other than foreign aid, the
estimation results are similar to those in Table 2 in terms of signs and signi¯cances.
In Panel A, where multilateral aid from the aid institutions such as the World Bank,
the IMF, and regional development banks are used, a reduction impact of multilateral aid
is found to be larger than that of total foreign aid. This result may be attributed to the
fact that the donor institutions normally require that recipient countries make corruption
reduction commitments a condition to provide ¯nancial assistance. The aid from international
institutions tends to focus on altruistic purposes, rather than strategic ones, compared to
bilateral aid donors.
In Panels B to E, bilateral aid from France, Japan, the UK, and the US are used. Except
for Japan, bilateral aid from these major donor countries generally has no signi¯cant impact
on corruption. Bilateral aid is often related to strategic purposes between donor and recipient
countries and to historical relationships, such as former colonies. Therefore, donor countries
may not care much about institutional quality. Bilateral aid from Japan has a signi¯cant
reduction e®ect on corruption, partly because relationships with former colony countries are
not as close as those in the other three countries investigated in this study.
[Table 3 here]
Finally, as a robustness check, we also conduct the same analysis using another corruption
index, the Corruption Perceptions Index, released by Transparency International. We obtain
similar results, although we do not report the estimation results.4
4 Conclusion
This paper examines the e®ect of foreign aid on corruption using quantile regression analysis.
Our estimation results show that foreign aid generally decreases the corruption level and, in
particular, its reduction e®ect is larger in countries with low levels of corruption. In addition,
analyzing the e®ects of foreign aid by donors indicates that while multilateral aid has a larger
reduction impact on corruption, except for Japan, bilateral aid from the world's leading donor
countries, including France, the UK, and the US, has no signi¯cant e®ect.
The results from our study provide some policy implications. Although foreign aid is
considered an important element to reduce poverty, since foreign aid may increase the op-
4The detailed results can be provided from the authors upon request.
4
portunities of rent-seeking behaviors, careful attention should be paid to its side e®ect. Our
estimation results suggest that donors should be more prudent when they provide aid to coun-
tries with higher levels of corruption. Multilateral aid implementation should be encouraged
rather than bilateral aid.
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p
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